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Wittgenstein´s Critique of Gödel´s Incompleteness Results  
Martin Ohmacht, Klagenfurt 
Motto: "Don´t treat your common sense like an umbrella. When you 
come into a room to philosophize, don´t leave it outside but bring it 
in with you" (Wittgenstein 1939 LFM Unit VI page 68) 
 
It is often said that Gödel´s famous theorem of 1931 is 
equal to the Cretian Liar, who says that everything that he 
says is a lie. But Gödel´s result is only similar to this 
sophism and not equivalent to it. When mathematicians 
deal with Gödel´s theorem, then it is often the case that 
they become poetical or even emotional: some of them 
show a high esteem of it and others despise it. Wittgen-
stein sees the famous Liar as a useless language game 
which doesn´t excite anybody. Gödel´s first incomplete-
ness theorem shows us that in mathematics there are 
puzzles which have no solution at all and therefore in 
mathematics one should be very careful when one 
chooses a puzzle on which one wants to work. Gödel´s 
second imcompleteness theorem deals with hidden 
contradictions – Wittgenstein shows a paradigmatic 
solution: he simply shrugs his shoulders on this problem 
and many mathematicians do so today as well. Wittgen-
stein says than Gödel´s results should not be treated as 
mathematical theorems, but as elements of the humanistic 
sciences. Wittgenstein sees them as something which 
should be worked on in a creative manner.  
1. Gödel in 1931 worked near the abyss of 
contradiction 
Let me first give a brief overview on Gödel´s results of 
1931 – because when I speak of Gödel I am always only 
thinking of this year. Gödel has achieved many other 
results, but they are not discussed in literature to the same 
degree as his result of 1931. 
Gödel has proved in a formal manner that mathematics 
has gaps. His result is very tricky. In secondary literature I 
have found the statement, that Gödel works near the 
abyss of contradiction (see my book on the Heptagon, 
Ohmacht 1997, page 88). I want to show this closeness to 
contradiction by exposing two statements to you, both of 
which bear a close resemblance to Gödel´s result, but the 
two are different in the sense that one renders a contradic-
tion and the other renders the desired result, and this 
situation exists even though these two sentences are very 
similar in their structure. 
The first statement was and always has been very 
popular within philosophy. The sentence is attributed to 
Epimenides. (Taschner (2002, page 17) maintains that it 
was reported by a Sophist named Eubulides). It has 
something puzzling in it. It runs as follows: 
„I am lying“  
A friend of mine, who is a computer specialist is always 
saying that Gödel´s result stemmed from this utterance, 
and he is right in the sense that Gödel was inspired by this 
sentence. One can read on page 149 of the first volume of 
Gödel´s “Collected Works”: “It [the incompleteness result] 
is closely related to the “Liar”” . But it is wrong to say that 
Gödel´s argument is equivalent to the Liar, because Gödel 
used a slightly different statement for his proof. The reason 
for this slight shift is, that the Liar´s confession renders a 
contradiction, whereas the statement which was used by 
Gödel in his proof is not contradictory, although it looks as 
if it is. Gödel´s statement runs as follows: 
This statement cannot be proved 
It is of utmost importance to see the point: that the Liar´s 
confession leads to a contradiction, whereas this state-
ment does not!  
2. Mathematicians become emotional when 
they comment on Gödel´s result 
Now let me, before I present the kernel of Wittgenstein´s 
reaction to Gödel, embark on the reactions of mathemati-
cian to this important contribution to mathematics. There is 
an important author, whom some of you may already know 
: I am talking of Stuart Shanker. He contributes a paper of 
more than a hundred pages on „Wittgenstein and Gödel“. 
There are two important points, which I want to quote to 
you.  
One of the most important facts in this long paper is that 
Shanker compares Gödel´s result with a symphony (1988 
page 156). (He quotes the idea from Nagel&Newman 1958 
page 94f). 
It is quite remarkable that a philosopher of mathematics 
should become poetical about a mathematical result; one 
could even say that Shanker becomes emotional about 
this result of the year 1931. There is a strong positive 
connotation in his evaluation. There is a rule in the 
philosophy of science that one should not make value 
judgements about scientific results - yet that is exactly 
what Shanker does: he expresses his high esteem of 
Gödel´s theorems without shyness. The direction of his 
statement is a positive one: you will see in a moment why I 
have to stress this. 
There are, as well, negative statements about Gödel – 
for example in „Collier´s encyclopaedia“. I quote from the 
edition of the year 1969. In an article on the philosophy of 
mathematics, it is said that Gödel has „unfortunately“ 
(1969 Vol 15, page 550a) proved his result. It is quite an 
unprecedented expression in the philosophy of mathe-
matics to say that a result has been achieved „unfortu-
nately“. I want to engrave this on your minds and this is 
why I want to repeat myself: the anonymous author within 
this encylcopaedia says that Gödel has „unfortunately“ 
proved this result. 
So here is my conclusion in this section: there is a 
contradiction about Gödel. Some authors are quite 
delighted about the ingenuity of Gödel´s proof – and others 
are disgusted by it. 
3. Wittgenstein sees the Liar´s Paradox as a 
useless language game 
This contradiction on the level of attitudes towards Gödel 
warns us that an investigation on the reception of this 
result is not such an easy task. 
I have found a quotation in an essay by a mathematician 
who is in error about Wittgenstein and Gödel: he states 
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(wrongly) that Wittgenstein never made a single remark 
about Gödel. Karl Sigmund writes: "Another remarkable 
parallel between Hahn and Wittgenstein is that both never 
mentioned Gödel in their philosophical writings" (DePauli-
Schimanovich/Köhler/Stadler 1995 page 240). This 
statement annoys me: Wittgenstein has, on the contrary, 
done quite a lot of work on Gödel, his LFM (VGM in 
German), which is in the long version called „Lectures on 
the Foundations of Mathematics Cambridge 1939“ are 
mainly devoted to Gödel.  
In this book Wittgenstein makes a remark, which is central 
to our topic. Wittgenstein’s position is as following: 
"„I am lying“ [...] it is just a useless language game and 
why should anybody be excited" (Wittgenstein LFM Unit 
XXI page 207) 
Indeed, Wittgenstein´s statement accurately reflects the 
attitude of mathematicians of around 1900 towards our 
problem. Some researchers knew very well about the 
contradictions which arise when one mathematicizes the 
known paradoxes. Especially Cantor did know that there 
were „inconsistent sets“, like the well known set of all sets. 
The problem with Wittgenstein´s statement is that it is 
dis-integrative; the Liar´s paradox is excluded from 
mathematics, and here Wittgenstein works right against 
Gödel, whose ingenious idea was, on the contrary, to 
mathematicize the liar´s paradox by using this Gödel 
numbering technique. This had beforehand seemed to be 
impossible. 
4. To give up the solving of a puzzle 
My fourth paragraph concerns puzzles, especially 
unsolvable puzzles. This paragraph is a central point in my 
presentation; now when I talk on puzzles, I could also 
chose the word „enigma“, which means essentially the 
same. It is the Greek word and the reason why I shall use 
it is, that a puzzle might be confused with a jigsaw puzzle. 
A jigsaw puzzle contains a collection of pieces made from 
cardboard. It is for children and it has a remarkable 
property: if one has enough time and motivation, then a 
jigsaw puzzle always has a solution. (Unless if a part of 
cardboard has been lost.) When I talk about enigmata, 
then I want to use a concept which arises for example, 
when one reads Thomas Samuel Kuhn. 
Here, it is not known whether the enigma has a solution 
or not. Here, when I discuss this property hopefully in a 
clear manner, then there is an acute logical distinction: 
there are enigmata that have a solution and there are 
enigmata that do not.  
When one studies the history of science, whereby the 
history of mathematics is meant here, a lot of fuss is made 
about such puzzles – Kuhn uses the word “crisis”. Kuhn´s 
point is: ”Failure to achieve a solution discredits only the 
scientist and not the theory” (1996 page 80). If one wants 
to be a normal scientist, it is advisable not to tackle 
unsolvable puzzles. 
Wittgenstein´s central point in his LFM is the following: if 
several researchers try to solve the enigma and many 
researchers fail to be successful, this does not mean that 
the puzzle is unsolvable. Wittgenstein uses the word "we" 
which is a short form of what Kuhn later calls the scientific 
community: "We ... perhaps gave up the problem 
altogether" (LFM Unit IX page 88) It might even be the 
case that some researchers suspect that the puzzle may 
be unsolvable, while others are still entangled in fruitless 
research. Those who are suspicious will stop participating 
in research, but as long as they cannot frame their 
suspicious attitude into a proof, the others will continue in 
their search. 
5. The question of a hidden contradiction 
Wittgenstein´s critique of Gödel´s results of 1931 must be 
subdivided into his reception of Gödel´s 1st Incompleteness 
Theorem and his reception of Gödel´s 2nd Incompleteness 
Theorem. What I have said about unsolvable puzzles 
refers to the first incompleteness theorem – now let us 
embark on the second. The question of hidden contradic-
tions arises here.  
The problem here is the principle of "ex falso sequitur 
quodlibet": from a contradictory proposition anything can 
be concluded. It is exactly this point that makes Gödel´s 
second Incompleteness Theorem a little bit confusing: If 
mathematics should contain a contradiction, then it can be 
proved that mathematics is free from contradictions! 
Wittgenstein has a simple solution for this "horror 
contradictionis" from which mathematicians suffer: he says 
"Well then, just don´t draw any conclusions from a 
contradiction".(LFM Unit XXII page 220). Now I want to 
refer to Collier´s Encyclopaedia again and we shall see 
that mathematicians have adopted Wittgenstein´s method: 
"... no contradiction has ever been detected during that 
period. So most mathematicians have simply stopped 
worrying about these matters and go on with their work 
as if they believed that no contradiction will ever occur" 
(Vol 15 page 550 column a). So, we can conclude from 
this statement that mathematicians just shrug their 
shoulders and – they largely ignore Gödel´s result.  
6. Gödel´s reaction to Wittgenstein´s 
reaction to the Incompleteness Theorems 
Now I must warn you, this paragraph contains a frustrating 
bit of literature. When it comes to research work done on 
Gödel, Hao Wang is an important author: his book, 
"Reflections on Kurt Gödel", is a voluminous account of the 
talks which he had with Gödel. The miracle which 
becomes apparent here is, that Gödel allowed Hao Wang 
to come into contact with him. On page 48, under the title 
"Relation to the Schlick Circle", Hao Wang begins to report 
on Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein occurs relatively often in this 
book – from the Index, it can be seen, that he occurs more 
than 40 times.  
Hao Wang shows that Gödel studied Wittgenstein´s 
Tractatus in 1927, and the later reading of Wittgenstein 
was presented to him by Hao Wang. Hao Wang and Gödel 
discussed Wittgenstein on the 5th of April 1972, but the 
material which Hao Wang produces in his book in enriched 
by a letter which Gödel sent to the mathematician Menger 
on the 20th of May in the same year. I want to present the 
quotation from Hao Wangs book in full, because it is so 
important. Here, Gödel writes: 
"As far as my theorem about undecidable propositions is 
concerned, it is indeed clear ... that Wittgenstein did not 
understand it (or pretended not to understand it). He 
interprets it as a kind of logical paradox, while in fact it is 
just the opposite, namely a mathematical theorem within 
an absolutely uncontroversial part on mathematics 
(finitary number theory or combinatorics)" (page 49). 
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When I first encountered this quotation about two years 
ago, this was a severe attack on my personal comfort – 
and even when I read it now, it is torture for me. 
Now I would like to bring in Thomas Samuel Kuhn – in 
his famous essay he says that when revolutions occur, 
then the researchers among each other produce many 
misunderstandings. What I do think about Gödel´s 
statement is the following: Gödel said that Wittgenstein did 
not understand him, but did Gödel understand Wittgen-
stein?? I think that the question of whether Wittgenstein 
has understood Gödel is controversial in character and the 
side which I want to take here is, that Wittgenstein did 
understand Gödel, though in a creative manner "in einer 
geisteswissenschaftlichen Art" (as a part of the humani-
ties). 
7. Wittgensteins Remarks on Gödel´s 
Results  
Wittgenstein´s "Remarks on the Foundations of Mathe-
matics" were published in 1956, but then in 1978 an 
enlarged edition was published. I want to quote from 
section VII of this edition, most of which was written by 
Wittgenstein in January of the year 1941 (see page 31 for 
this point). Although Wittgenstein´s remark on Gödel does 
not contain the appropriate respect, which Gödel would 
have deserved, but it is a very clear statement, which 
produces in bewilderment on the part of the logicians. 
Wittgenstein notes: 
"My task is, not to talk about ... Gödel´s proof, but to by-
pass it." (1978 page 383) This statement is not very 
polite, and it is not entirely clear what Wittgenstein is 
heading for when he articulates it. I would like to give an 
interpretation, but I am not very firm here: I am weak. 
Wittgenstein should have been more serious about 
Gödel´s results. 
Gödel´s proof of 1931 is a firm mathematical result – there 
do not arise any questions about it. It is an utterly 
uncontroversial result and Wittgenstein rather should 
accept it than to make unclear statements about it. When, 
about a year ago, I wanted to quote this passage from 
memory I paraphrased it in the following way: Wittgenstein 
 
 
said, that we should ignore Gödel´s result. This expression 
“ignore” is definitely too strong to be a correct interpreta-
tion of what Wittgenstein really says. 
But Gödel´s proof is not only a mathematical result. It is 
also a philosophical result, which circumscribes mathe-
matics from the outside. One can approach – and I think, 
this is what Wittgenstein intends to do – Gödel´s result 
from a standpoint which lies within the humanities. 
Wittgenstein wants to look at Gödel´s proof not as a 
mathematical result, but as a part of the humanities 
("Geisteswissenschaften") . This is what he means with his 
statement about bypassing Gödel.  
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